NORTH
CAROLINA
DURHAM COUNTY
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IN
THE GENERAL COURT OF
JUSTICE
SUPERIOR
COURT DIVISION
FILE NO. 95 CVS 05585
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| JANE
COPE, individually and as
Administratrix ) |
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| of
the Estate of Jimmy Ray
Cope, deceased |
) |
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) |
| Plaintiff, |
) |
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) |
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| vs. |
) |
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) |
| GLAXO
WELLCOME, INC. and BURROUGHS |
) |
| WELLCOME,
CO., |
) |
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) |
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Defendants.
) |
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PLAINTIFF'S
MEMORANDUM
IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT |
I.
INTRODUCTION
This
cause is before the Court on defendants' Motion
for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the
North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.
Plaintiff's husband was the third of three
patients who died during 1994 of a massive
overdose of a cancer chemotherapy drug known as
Navelbine® (defendant's name for the drug
"vinorelbine"), a dangerous, toxic agent
that was manufactured by Burroughs Wellcome
(Bigley dep. p. 85). In each of these deaths the
nurse administering the drug read the label on the
container as stating 10 mg of Navelbine®
rather than 50 mg (Bigley dep. Exhibit 26). In
fact the label involved in each of these deaths
stated "10 mg vinorelbine per mL," although
the vial actually contained 50 mg of the drug
(Bigley dep. Exhibit 15, p. 2). After the three
overdose deaths defendant changed the label to
read A50 mg/5 mL." (Defendant's Amended
Response to Plaintiff's First Set of
Interrogatories, No. 2 and No. 23).
In
summary, Mr. Cope died because the Navelbine®
product was dangerously defective due to the fact
that the label on the container was not adequate.
Although the container had 50 mg of drug in it the
numeral 10 mg appeared prominently on the label,
the nurse saw that and thought that was the
quantity of the drug in the container (Williams
dep. p 47; Exhibit 3). The label in this case was
contrary to standard industry practice and
standards which was to show the total quantity of
drug on the label (Wogalter affidavit).
This
same type of overdosing error caused by the fact
that the label stated 10 mg rather than the total
quantity of 50 mg had occurred twice before Mr.
Cope's overdose during 1994. In addition, FDA
safety regulations required the defendant to
notify all physicians using Navelbine®
in their practices, including Mr. Cope's doctor,
that these overdoses had occurred and why they
occurred. The defendant failed to comply with
these safety regulations and did not notify Mr.
Cope's doctor of the prior overdose deaths in a
timely and adequate manner. Defendant's violation
of the federal safety regulations is negligence per
se.
Further,
plaintiff has provided an affidavit from Dr.
Michael S. Wogalter, a nationally known expert in
human factors/ergonomics/pharmaceutical matters
who has stated his opinion that the label in this
case was defective and not adequate. The facts of
this case also show that further confusion
aggravating the defective and inadequate label was
caused by defendant's shipping of two types of
containers to the doctor's office for treatment of
Mr. Cope, all labeled 10 mg but with some
containing 10 mg and some containing 50 mg.
There
are also admissions of defendant in this record
that the Navelbine® label involved in the overdose
deaths was not adequate, that defendant failed to
send safety information to physicians about the
facts and circumstances of the first overdose that
occurred in April of 1994 and defendant again
violated federal safety regulations by failing to
immediately notify physicians of the second
overdose death that occurred in July of 1994 prior
to Mr. Cope's overdose which occurred on August 3,
1994.
Plaintiff's
Complaint seeks damages against the defendant drug
manufacturer for the wrongful death of her husband
and for her severe emotional distress caused by
the defendants in failing to provide reasonable
and adequate packaging, instructions, warnings,
prescribing information and labeling text in
connection with Navelbine®; failing to
warn of known dangers which could be encountered
during foreseeable use of the drug; failing to
exercise its continuing duty to provide warnings
of deficiencies it learned existed in the
packaging, the packaging materials and labels
contained on the drug containers, which warnings
were required by federal safety regulations; and
failing to provide reasonable and timely warnings
and notice to health care providers administering
the drug concerning deficiencies. As a proximate
result of defendants' failures, negligence, breach
of the standard of care and unlawful conduct the
plaintiff's husband died of an overdose of
Navelbine®, and the plaintiff suffered severe
emotional distress.
This
action was filed on December 29, 1995, prior to
the effective date of recent changes in North
Carolina's punitive damages and product liability
laws. Defendant responded to the Complaint by
filing a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure. That matter was briefed and argued by
the parties, and, on July 3, 1996, this Court
denied defendants' Motion to Dismiss. At the
present time discovery is continuing in this
action. Ten depositions have been taken and
defendant has produced voluminous documents
pursuant to Plaintiff's
Request for Production of Documents and a Consent
Protective Order. Also, on February 7, 1997,
during the deposition of defendants' former
employee Dr. Judith Kramer, counsel for defendant
advised plaintiff's counsel that there are a
substantial number of additional documents
relevant to plaintiff's discovery requests that
had not been produced. On Friday, March 7, 1997,
plaintiff began analyzing copies of those
discovery documents, which are contained within
eight boxes located at the office of defense
counsel. More depositions are being scheduled
during April and the case is set for trial on May
19, 1997.
II.
THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACTS
PRECLUDING ENTRY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defendant's
answers to interrogatories, documents it has
produced during discovery, its responses to
Requests for Admission and depositions show that
at best for defendant, there are genuine issues of
material facts that must be resolved by a jury.
During 1994 plaintiff's decedent, Jimmy Ray Cope,
was 49 years old and lived in Durham with his wife
of 29 years, the plaintiff Jane Cope. Mr. Cope had
lung cancer and was under the care of Dr. Walter
E. Davis, a physician practicing at the Durham
Clinic. Although Mr. Cope was being treated for
lung cancer he continued to work every day, was
ambulatory and functioning. Mr. Cope was scheduled
to undergo treatment with an experimental
chemotherapy drug known as Navelbine®
that was manufactured by defendant Burroughs
Wellcome (which was subsequently merged into Glaxo
Wellcome, Inc. during 1995). Navelbine® was a
dangerous, toxic drug because it attacks healthy
organs and tissues in the same manner it attacks
cancer, and during 1994 Navelbine® had
not yet been approved for marketing by the United
States Food and Drug Administration (FDA)(Bigley
dep. p 85). The use of Navelbine® in
the treatment of human patients during this time
was strictly controlled and regulated by FDA
regulations while the safety and efficacy of the
drug were being studied.
The
proper dose for Mr. Cope was 50 mg of Navelbine®
for each treatment. Unfortunately, Burroughs
Wellcome shipped the Navelbine® to Durham Clinic
for administration to Mr. Cope in two different
sizes of containers. One container, referred to as
an ampule, contained 10 mg of Navelbine®
within one milliliter of fluid. The second size of
container, referred to as a vial, contained 50 mg
of Navelbine® within five milliliters
of fluid. The concentration of Navelbine® in both
the ampule and vial containers was 10 mg/mL, and
the label on each size of container confusingly
stated, "10 mg vinorelbine per mL" (Bigley
dep. Exhibit 15, p. 3). Burroughs Wellcome
provided both ampules and vials of Navelbine® to
Durham Clinic for Mr. Cope, even though each vial
contained exactly the proper quantity of Navelbine® for Mr. Cope's dose (DeAngelis dep. pp.
46-50; Williams dep. p 59).
Mr.
Cope's first course of Navelbine® treatment took
place on July 20, 1994 at Durham Clinic. During
this treatment Mr. Cope received the proper dose
of 50 mg of Navelbine® administered to
him intravenously, which was prepared in a
solution that used five ampules of Navelbine®,
each containing ten milligrams of Navelbine®.
On
July 27, 1994 Mr. Cope underwent his second course
of treatment with Navelbine® at Durham
Clinic. During this second course of treatment Mr.
Cope again received the proper dose of 50 mg of
Navelbine® administered to him
intravenously in a solution that was prepared
using five ampules of Navelbine®, each
containing ten milligrams of Navelbine®.
During these first two courses of treatment, the
same nurse administered the Navelbine®
to Mr. Cope. These initial two treatments used all
of the ampules (10 mg/mL) of Navelbine®
that Burroughs Wellcome had provided to Durham
Clinic for Mr. Cope, leaving only vials of
Navelbine® (50 mg/5mL) available for
subsequent treatments of Mr. Cope (Williams dep. p
60).
Mr.
Cope underwent his third and fatal course of
treatment with Navelbine® at Durham
Clinic on August 3, 1994. During this third course
of treatment a nurse who had not administered
Navelbine® to Mr. Cope previously,
administered the Navelbine® to him
intravenously by preparing a solution for him made
up of the contents of five vials of Navelbine®.
Consequently, on this third occasion Mr. Cope was
administered a lethal dose of 250 mg of Navelbine®,
which was five times greater than the amount of
Navelbine® he should have received on
this occasion. The nurse who administered the
Navelbine® to Mr. Cope on August 3,
1994, reasonably thought that each vial contained
10 mg rather than 50 mg. She testified that when
she read the label she saw "10 mg." (Williams
dep. p. 47). Indeed, nowhere on the label did the
numeral "50" appear (Kramer dep. Exhibit 3).
Ms. Cope was physically present with her husband
during all three of his Navelbine® treatments
(Cope affidavit).
On
August 5, 1994 Mr. Cope was admitted to Durham
Regional Hospital for treatment of his overdose,
which manifested itself by the appearance of
severe symptoms. At the time of Mr. Cope's
admission to the hospital his treating physician
was unaware that Mr. Cope had been administered an
overdose on August 3. The fact of the overdose was
not discovered until August 9, 1994. On this date
personnel at Durham Clinic read a letter from
Burroughs Wellcome dated and allegedly mailed on
August 3, 1994 (the date Mr. Cope was overdosed)
that informed physicians treating patients with
Navelbine® that there had been two
cases of Navelbine® overdoses in which
patients had been administered approximately five
times the amount of the drug that had been
prescribed because the administering nurses in
both cases read the label on the vial of Navelbine®
as containing 10 mg rather than 50 mg. Upon
reading this letter personnel at Durham Clinic
ascertained that Mr. Cope had been administered an
overdose of five times the amount of his
prescription because the nurse administering the
drug to him read the label on the container as
containing "10 mg" rather than 50 mg
(Williams dep. p 54).
During
Mr. Cope's hospitalization he was confused, toxic
and delirious, he suffered from hallucinations, he
had severe headaches, neck aches, irritated
discharge from his left eye, burning, blistering
and breaking down of the skin, kidney and liver
failure, and other ailments, and he died a
horrible death over a twelve day period which
culminated on August 17, 1994. The cause of his
death was the Navelbine® overdose
(Davis dep. p 96). Ms. Cope remained with her
husband in his hospital room continuously from the
day of his admission on August 5, 1994 until his
death on August 17, 1994 (Cope affidavit).
A.
ADEQUACY OF THE LABEL IS A JURY ISSUE
In
the case of prescription drugs "...the
adequacy of the warning by the manufacturer shall
be determined by the prescribing information made
available by the manufacturer to the health care
practitioner..." G.S. ' 99B-4(1). In North
Carolina issues of the adequacy of labels and
warnings are usually considered jury issues. In Reid
v. Eckerds Drugs, Inc., 40 N.C. App. 476, 253
S.E.2d 344 (1979), the plaintiff suffered burns
after applying deodorant from an aerosol can and
attempting to light a cigarette. The plaintiff had
put the can down, walked across the room and
struck a match to light a cigarette when the burns
occurred. Although the deodorant conformed to
federal standards for flammability the Court found
that the labeling of the deodorant, viewed in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff, was not
sufficient as a matter of law to entitle defendant
to summary judgment. AA question of fact as to the
sufficiency of the packaging and labeling clearly
exists and is one for the jury." Id.,
253 S.E.2d at 350. In Salmon v. Parke, Davis
and Company, 520 F.2d 359 (4th Cir. 1975), the
Fourth Circuit, applying North Carolina law,
reversed the trial court's entry of summary
judgment in an action brought by the guardian ad
litem of a child against a drug manufacturer based
on its failure to warn physicians effectively of a
drug's hazards. The Court noted that a jury could
reasonably find that the company failed to warn
physicians with an emphasis that was commensurate
with the risk, that a jury could further conclude
that the fault of misuse of the drug should be
shared by both the manufacturer and the physician,
and that the action could not properly be decided
by the Court as a matter of law:
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Our
catalog of permissible inferences is
intended neither to define nor to decide the
issues in this case. It serves simply to
illustrate our reasons for concluding that
summary judgment is inappropriate and that,
as in negligence actions generally, it is
for the jury to say whether the defendant
breached its duty to exercise reasonable
care. |
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Id.
at 1363.
Likewise,
in a case against Burroughs Wellcome involving an
anesthetic called Fluothan and a muscle relaxant
called Anacetine, our Supreme Court held that the
adequacy of a warning was a jury question. Holley
v. Burroughs Wellcome Co., 318 N.C. 352, 348
S.E.2d 772 (1986). And, as our Court of Appeals
pointed out in Ziglar v. E. I. Dupont De
Nemours and Co., 53 N.C. App. 147, 280 S.E.2d
510, 513 (1981), disc. review denied, 304 N.C.
393, 285 S.E.2d 838 (1981):
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It
is elemental that it is usually the jury's
prerogative to apply the standard of
reasonable care in a negligence action,
and summary judgment is, therefore,
appropriate only in exceptional cases
where the movant shows that one or more of
the essential elements of the claim do not
appear in the pleadings or proof at the
discovery stage of the proceedings. Ragland
v. Moore, 299 N.C. 360, 261 S.E.2d 666
(1980). See, e.g., Moore v.
Fieldcrest Mills, Inc., 296 N.C.
467, 251 S.E.2d 419 (1979); Strickland
v. Dri-Spray Division Development, 51
N.C. App. 57, 275 S.E.2d 503 (1981). |
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This
case is not such an exceptional case because there
is overwhelming evidence in this record that
defendant's Navelbine® label was
clearly inadequate.
1.
Evidence of the First Two Overdoses Creates a
Prima Facie Case of Defect, Notice to Defendant
and Causation
It
is undisputed that prior to Mr. Cope's overdose
and in close proximity thereto, two other patients
died of Navelbine® overdoses under
identical circumstances to the facts of Mr. Cope's
overdose because administering nurses read the
label on the vial as containing 10 mg rather than
50 mg. Under longstanding North Carolina law this
evidence establishes a prima facie case of defect
of the product and notice to the defendant of the
defect with the corresponding duty to provide
reasonable and adequate warnings to physicians
treating patients with Navelbine®.
Evidence of prior similar accidents involving a
product is admissible to prove fault and notice to
the manufacturer. In Perry v. Kelford Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 196 N.C. 690, 691, 146 S.E. 805
(1929), our Supreme Court reasoned as follows:
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evidence
of the occurrence of similar events is
probative on an issue...[of] whether a
like occurrence happened at another
time...for under such circumstances the
observed uniformity of nature raises an
inference that like causes will produce
like results even though there may be some
dissimilarity of conditions... |
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In
Maybank v. Kresge Co., 46 N.C. App. 687,
690, 266 S.E.2d 409, 411 (1980), modified and
aff'd, 302 N.C. 129, 273 S.E.2d 681 (1981),
the Court stated that A[p]laintiff could have
established a jury question on the issue of
negligence by showing similar occurrences."
See Byrd, Proof of Negligence in North Carolina:
Part II - Similar Occurrences and Violations of
Statute, 48 N.C.L.Rev. 731, 736, 739 (1970) (AThe
Court has adopted a liberal view of what
constitutes 'substantially similar
circumstances' in the vast majority of cases...The
evidence of similar occurrences may establish a prima
facie case of negligence...") Accord, J.
Stansbury, STANSBURY'S NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE, '
89 (2nd rev. ed. 1982), where the following
appears:
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Evidence
of similar occurrences or conditions may,
in negligence actions, be admitted as
relevant to the issue of negligence for
example, to show a defective or dangerous
machine, place or condition, or to the
issues of defendants' knowledge, or to the
issue of causation... |
|
2.
Defendant has admitted the Navelbine®
label was
not adequate
Facts
have been established during discovery that
constitute an admission on the part of the
defendant that the Navelbine® label was
"not
adequate." These facts show that during 1994,
before Mr. Cope's overdose, but after the first
two overdoses, Dr. Judith E. Kramer, an officer of
defendant and head of U.S. Clinical Research
(Bigley dep. p. 70), told Joseph Bigley, who was
section head of Experimental Oncology of
defendant, that the Navelbine® label was "not
adequate" (Kramer dep. p. 74). In addition,
Dr. Kramer testified that she suspected she may
have said, "Well, gee, why didn't we have the
total dose on that
1
See deposition of Joseph Bigley, pp. 67-94 and
Exhibit 2 thereto; deposition of Dr. Judith E.
Kramer, pp. 57-77 and Exhibit 1 thereto.
label?"(Kramer
dep. p. 74). During the telephone conversation
between these two key employees of defendant, Mr.
Bigley took detailed handwritten notes of
statements made to him by his superior, Dr.
Kramer, who was responsible for the Oncology
Department which was conducting the Navelbine®
trials. (Bigley dep. Exhibit 2; Kramer dep.
Exhibit 1). Other telling admissions made by Dr.
Kramer during the conversation which were
explicitly spelled out in Mr. Bigley's notes, are
to the effect that defendant violated federal
safety regulations by not sending safety
information to physicians treating patients with
Navelbine® after the first overdose,
and by not notifying the physicians
"immediately" (Bigley dep. pp. 78-79)
after the second overdose. These admissions are
discussed in more detail hereinbelow.
3.
There is Evidence that Defendant was Negligent in
Manufacturing an
Inherently Dangerous, Toxic Substance Without
Taking Reasonable
Precautions to Decrease the Risk of Confusing 50
mg with 10 mg.
After
Mr. Cope's tragic overdose, defendant sent
fluorescent stickers that stated "50 mg/5mL"
to the offices of physicians treating patients
with Navelbine® to be placed on all
Navelbine® vial containers, and
defendant also changed the label on the Navelbine®
vial to read "50 mg/5mL" rather than A10 mg
vinorelbine per mL." (Bigley dep. pp. 45-47;
Defendant's Amended Response to Plaintiff's First
Set of Interrogatories, No. 2 and No. 23). These
facts create a factual issue for a jury as to
whether defendant was negligent in providing an
inherently dangerous, toxic substance to
physicians for their use in treating patients
without taking reasonable precautions to decrease
the risk of the lethal confusion of 50 mg with 10
mg. In this regard, the Court of Appeals held the
following in Ziglar, supra, 280 S.E.2d at
516:
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The
law requires a manufacturer to eliminate
the dangerous character of goods to the
extent that the exercise of reasonable
care, considering all of the
circumstances, enables him to do so. See Cashwell
v. Bottling Works, 174 N.C. 324,
93 S.E. 901 (1917). It is not without
significance, therefore, that DuPont began
bottling Vydate L in gray, opaque
containers, on 24 May 1974, shortly after
this tragic accident occurred, as
requested by the State of North Carolina,
and that it added amber coloration to the
colorless poison in January 1975. Thus,
on this record, a critical factual issue,
and one not susceptible to disposition by
summary judgment, was whether DuPont was
negligent in manufacturing an inherently
dangerous, toxic substance without taking
reasonable precautions to decrease the
risk of its lethal confusion with
ordinary, harmless drinking water.
(emphasis supplied) |
|
Similarly,
defendant suspended its use of ampules for the
packaging of Navelbine® in the
Treatment IND after Mr. Cope's death, which under
the rationale explained above in Ziglar,
creates a fact issue regarding plaintiff's claim
that defendant was negligent by packaging
Navelbine® in both ampules and vials
and without clearly stating the quantity of drug
contained within each size of container. (Martini
dep. Exhibit 1; Bigley dep. Exhibit 18).
4.
The Affidavit of Plaintiff's Expert Creates a Fact
Issue of Adequacy of the Label
Plaintiff
has presented the Affidavit of Michael S.
Wolgalter, Ph.D., a highly qualified expert in
human factors/ergonomics, who is an Associate
Professor of Psychology at North Carolina State
University, to the effect that the Navelbine®
label implicated in the three overdose deaths
during 1994 was not adequate
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B.
DEFENDANT VIOLATED FEDERAL SAFETY
REGULATIONS BY FAILING TO WARN PHYSICIANS,
INCLUDING MR. COPE'S PHYSICIAN, THAT THE
NAVELBINE7 VIAL CONTAINED 50 MG OF
NAVELBINE®
RATHER THAN 10 MG, AND THAT COMPETENT
CHEMOTHERAPY NURSES HAD READ THE LABEL AS
CONTAINING 10 MG RATHER THAN 50 MG |
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1.
Defendant Violated Federal Safety
Regulations Which Required it to Provide
Physicians Treating Patients with
Navelbine®
with an IND Safety Report Containing
Information about the April 1994 Overdose
Death AAs Soon as Possible and in No Event
Later than 10 Working Days after the
Sponsor's Initial Receipt of the
Information." |
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Defendant
learned of the first Navelbine®
overdose on April 22, 1994. As noted hereinabove,
during 1994 Navelbine®was a cancer
chemotherapy drug that was the subject of clinical
trials and Navelbine® had not yet been
approved by the FDA for marketing. Navelbine's®
use in the treatment of human patients was
restricted and controlled by federal regulations.
These regulations required defendant to notify FDA
and all participating investigators (Mr. Cope's
physician at Durham Clinic was a participating
investigator) in a written IND (investigational
drug) Safety Report of any fatal or
life-threatening overdose associated with the use
of Navelbine®. 21 C.F.R. Sec.
312.32(c) required that such notification
"shall
be made as soon as possible and in no event
later than 10 working days after the sponsor's
(Burroughs Wellcome Co.) initial receipt of the
information."(emphasis supplied) In addition,
21 C.F.R. Sec. 312.55(a) required defendant to
give each participating clinical investigator an
Investigator's Brochure containing Aa summary of
information relating to safety and effectiveness
in humans obtained from prior clinical
studies." Furthermore, 21 C.F.R. Sec.
312.55(b) required the following with respect to
safety reports:
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The
sponsor [Burroughs Wellcome, Co.] shall,
as the overall investigation proceeds,
keep each participating investigator
informed of new
2
Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Second
Set of Interrogatories, No. 25.
observations
discovered by or reported to the sponsor
on the drug particularly with respect to
adverse effects and safe use. Such
information may be distributed to
investigators by means of periodically
revised Investigator's Brochures, reprints
or published studies, reports or letters
to clinical investigators, or other
appropriate means. Important safety
information is required to be relayed to
investigators in accordance with Sec.
312.32. |
|
In
addition to receipt of notice on April 22, 1994,
that a patient had died of a Navelbine®
overdose, on April 25, 1994 defendant received by
facsimile transmission from the site of the
investigation where this patient had died, the
following information:
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(a)
the patient's death was caused by a
Navelbine® overdose;
(b) that the dose that was actually
administered to the patient on the day in
question was 197.5 mg of Navelbine®
whereas the dose ordered by the physician
was 39.5 mg and was reconfirmed by phone
with the administering nurse prior to the
fatal drug administration;
(c) that the registered nurse who prepared
and administered the medication had been
in the employment of the
investigator-physician's practice for
seventeen months and administered
approximately four to fifty chemotherapy
treatments per week;
(d) that the nurse had been trained to
give chemotherapy during a twelve month
period of direct supervision by the
practices's senior chemotherapy nurse who
also had six years of experience in the
administration of investigational and
conventional chemotherapy;
(e) that when questioned about this error,
the nurse related that she read the label
as containing 10 mg and not 10
mg/mL;
(f) that, indeed, on no vial of medication
[Navelbine®] is there any
indication of the total dose contained in
the vial;
(g) that while the error was a nursing
calculation error such a problem may
possibly have been obviated by an
indication of total dose on the
label;
(h) that this type of labeling [showing
total dose] is seen on all other similar
drugs; and
(i)
that the physician's practice was unaware
of any other mixing or dosing errors
performed by this nurse in her seventeen
months of employment or prior to her
employment. |
(Adamkiewicz
dep. Exhibit 3)
Pursuant
to the applicable federal safety regulations cited
herein, Burroughs Wellcome Co. was required to
A...keep each participating investigator
[including Dr. Walter E. Davis of Durham Clinic]
informed of new observations discovered by or
reported to the sponsor on the drug, particularly
with respect to adverse effects and safe use."
21 C.F.R. Sec. 312.55(b) (emphasis supplied). In
addition, the Investigator's Brochure that was
provided to Dr. Davis and the Durham Clinic prior
to the beginning of Mr. Cope's treatment with
Navelbine® during the summer of 1994,
should have contained the information that
Burroughs Wellcome Co. had received from the
physician whose patient suffered a fatal Navelbine®
overdose during April of 1994. Information was not
provided to physicians about the April 1994
overdose until the
3
See GL00421,(Davis dep. Exhibit 2) a letter dated
July 6, 1994, from defendant's Barbara Orban to
Dr. Walter E. Davis, specifying the IND Safety
Reports included within his Investigator's
Brochure. Unfortunately, neither Dr. Davis nor the
other physicians treating patients with Navelbine®
were provided information required by federal
regulations about the April 1994 overdose until
two more patients had died, including Mr. Cope.
mailing
of a letter dated August 3, 1994, the day Mr. Cope
received his overdose. (Bigley dep. Exhibit 3).
Discovery
documentation and deposition testimony taken in
this case show that defendant violated the
applicable Code of Federal Regulations identified
hereinabove (1) by failing to notify all
participating investigators in a written IND
Safety Report of the first fatal Navelbine®
overdose that occurred during April of 1994 Aas
soon as possible and in no event later than 10
working days" after the company's initial
receipt of the information; (2) by failing to
provide information concerning the circumstances
of the April 1994 Navelbine® overdose to
investigators treating patients with Navelbine®,
including Dr. Walter E. Davis of the Durham
Clinic, prior to the time Dr. Davis and the Durham
Clinic began treating Mr. Cope with Navelbine®;
and (3) by failing to provide a summary of the
information concerning the April, 1994 overdose as
a part of the Investigator's Brochure prior to the
time that Mr. Cope began receiving Navelbine®
treatment.
2.
Defendant's Violation of Safety Regulations is
Negligence per se.
The
violation of a safety regulation promulgated by
the executive branch of government which imposes a
duty upon the defendant in order to promote the
safety of others, including the plaintiff, is
negligence per se. Baldwin v. GTE South, Inc.,
335 N.C. 544, 439 S.E.2d 108 (1994) (violation of
a Department of Transportation safety regulation
is negligence per se). Such negligence of the
defendant A...is actionable if it is the proximate
cause of injury." Ratliff v. Duke Power
Co., 268 N.C. 605, 610, 151 S.E.2d 641, 645
(1966). The regulatory standard is conclusive on
the issue of reasonable care and the defendant is
negligent as a matter of law as the Supreme Court
of North Carolina stated in the case of Carr v.
Murrows Transfer, Inc., 262 N.C. 550, 554, 138
S.E.2d 228, 231 (1964):
|
It
is the generally accepted view that the
violation of a statute enacted for the
safety and protection of the public
constitutes negligence per se, i.e.,
negligence as a matter of law. The statute
prescribes the standard and the standard
fixed by the statute is absolute. The
common law rule of ordinary care does not
apply - proof of the breach of the statute
is proof of negligence. The violator is
liable if injury or damage results,
irrespective of how careful or prudent he
has been in other respects. No person is
at liberty to adopt other methods and
precautions which in his opinion are
equally or more efficacious to avoid
injury...In short, where a statute or
municipal ordinance imposes upon any
person a specific duty for the protection
or benefit of others, if he neglects to
perform that duty, he is liable to those
for whose protection or benefit it was
imposed for any injuries or damage of the
character which the statute or ordinance
was designed to prevent, and which was
proximately produced by such neglect,
provided the injured party is free from
contributory negligence. |
|
In
Baldwin, supra, the plaintiff suffered
injuries when a vehicle struck the telephone booth
she was using. The booth was located within the
public right-of-way in violation of regulations of
the North Carolina Department of Transportation.
Although the Court of Appeals found that the
regulation had been enacted for safety reasons,
the Court was of the view that because the
plaintiff was a pedestrian rather than a motorist,
she was not in the class of protected persons.
Therefore the defendant's violation did not
constitute negligence per se. The Supreme Court
reversed, finding that although the regulation was
silent as to its purpose, the implied purpose was
to protect pedestrians who travel within the
public rights-of-way as well as motorists:
|
One
implied purpose is to protect the safety
of motorists by eliminating an obstruction
a motorist otherwise might strike...Here,
the telephone booth, which naturally
attracts pedestrians, was twenty-five feet
from the edge of the road yet within the
right-of-way. Logic dictates that the
purpose of this regulation was to protect
the safety of the motorist who might leave
the road and strike the booth while
simultaneously protecting the pedestrian
who might be using the booth. |
|
Baldwin,
supra, 335 N.C. at 547-548, 439 S.E.2d at 110.
The
purpose of the FDA safety regulations obviously is
to protect the safety of patients being treated
with investigational drugs that have not been
approved by the FDA for marketing (Bigley dep. pp.
66-67). In his deposition, Joseph Bigley, who was
defendant's Section Head in Clinical Oncology,
Clinical Research Division during 1994, testified
that he and the other employees of defendant who
were involved in clinical trials of
investigational drugs were thoroughly trained in
the provisions of the federal regulations and that
a safety report should have been sent to the
physicians during the Spring of 1994 but one was
not sent because defendant felt the April, 1994
overdose was a random act that had occurred for
the first time (Bigley dep. p. 73). However, Mr.
Bigley admitted that defendant was not allowed to
violate the safety regulations by not sending the
required safety information merely because this
was the first overdose that had occurred (Bigley
dep. p.74). An additional admission of defendant's
violation of 21 C.F.R Sec. 312.32(c) is found in
Mr. Bigley's handwritten notes concerning a
telephone conversation he had with Dr. Judith
Kramer, who was defendant's Vice President of U.S.
Clinical Research Division during 1994, concerning
the first two overdoses. With respect to the first
overdose, Mr. Bigley, who was taking notes while
Dr. Kramer spoke to him on the phone, wrote A1ST
OD in April...resulting in death - we should have
sent letter then."(Bigley dep. Exhibit 2;
Kramer dep. Exhibit 1)
3.
Defendant Again Violated Federal Safety
Regulations by Failing to Provide an IND Safety
Report to Physicians Treating Patients with
Navelbine® A...As
Soon as Possible... after Being Notified on July
25, 1994, That a Second Patient Had Been Overdosed
with Navelbine®.
Defendant
was notified of a second patient's Navelbine®
overdose on July 25, 1994. Defendant was notified
that this patient had died of her overdose on July
28, 1994. Defendant knew that this overdose was
caused by the fact that the nurse who administered
the drug read the label on the vial of Navelbine®
as containing 10 mg rather than 50 mg, which is
the identical circumstance that caused the initial
patient overdose during April of 1994 (Bigley dep.
Exhibits 3 - 5). Although the federal safety
regulations required defendant to provide this
important safety information to physicians
treating patients with Navelbine®,
including Mr. Cope's physician, defendant failed
to provide this information "...as soon as
possible..." 21 C.F.R. Sec. 312.32(c).
Defendant claims that it mailed the
required safety information about the first two
overdoses to the participating investigators on
August 3, 1994, the very date Mr. Cope was
administered the overdose in Durham. Other
information uncovered during discovery indicates
that although defendant"s letter concerning
the first two overdoses was dated August 3, 1994,
it may not have been mailed until August 5, 19945.
Regardless of the actual date the letter was
mailed, there is again overwhelming evidence that
defendant failed to reasonably and timely provide
an adequate warning and notice of the
circumstances of the first two overdoses. Mr.
Bigley"s handwritten notes of the statements
made to him by Dr. Kramer during their telephone
conversation following the second overdose states,
"why take so long
4
Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Second Set of
Interrogatories, No. 26
5 Martini dep. Exhibit 1; Bigley dep. Exhibit 18
between
7/28 [the date of the second patient's death] +
8/3 Inv. [investigators] letter + 8/8 FDA
letter." When questioned at his deposition
about these notes Mr. Bigley acknowledged that
someone [Dr. Kramer] must have felt the
information about the second overdose should have
been provided to the physicians "immediately."6
"Immediately" is the same as the requirement
of the federal regulation that such notice be
provided "...as soon as possible."
Regarding
the reasonableness of the timing of defendant's
notice dated August 3, 1994, and the means of
transmission of the notice or warning, it should
be noted that during the summer of 1994
defendant's employee Diane DeAngelis was in
regular communication with Durham Clinic
concerning Mr. Cope's enrollment in the Navelbine®
treatment program by telephone and fax from her
office at Research Triangle Park, North Carolina.
Ms. DeAngelis testified that she was aware of the
first two overdoses because they were big news in
her work area at Burroughs Wellcome at the times
they occurred (DeAngelis dep. p. 36). She
initially testified that safety information
concerning the overdoses was provided by defendant
to Mr. Cope's physician in "plenty of time"
before he was overdosed, but when questioned about
the dates of the Mr. Cope's overdose and
defendant"s letter to the investigators Ms.
DeAngelis changed her testimony, saying she
Amisspoke."(DeAngelis dep. pp. 26, 27).
4.
Information Contained in the Investigator's
Brochure, Open-label Protocol, and Correspondence
Concerning Use of Ampules and Vials Is
6
Bigley dep. pp. 78-79
Not
Adequate as a Matter of Law to Warn Health Care
Personnel That There Were 50 Mg of Navelbine®
in the Vial.
During
depositions defendant has questioned witnesses
about the contents of the lengthy Navelbine®
Investigator's Brochure, the Open-Label Protocol,
shipping documents and correspondence sent from
defendant to Durham Clinic prior to Mr. Cope's
overdose. Although there is information buried in
these documents indicating that Navelbine®
is supplied in 10 mg ampules and 50 mg vials [i.e.
see page 18 of open-label protocol attached as
Exhibit 3 to Dr. 1' deposition] these facts merely
provide further evidence of negligence on the part
of the defendant. Defendant should have clearly
and adequately shown the amount or quantity
of Navelbine® on the vial's label
rather than emphasize its concentration. It is
simply unreasonable to package a dangerous, highly
toxic substance into two sizes of containers with
each emphasizing the concentration of 10 mg and
with the label on the vial not clearly showing
that it contained 50 mg7. It is
unreasonable to package a dangerous drug in two
sizes of containers when the numeral shown on both
sizes states "10 mg." See article about the
1994 Navelbine® overdoses entitled
Accidental Overdoses of Investigational Drug
Because of a Misunderstood Label from Hospital
Pharmacy, Volume 30, at page 70, stating that,
"The label confusingly states ' 10 mg/mL' on both
sizes, and in each case practitioners confused the
contents of the 5 mL vial as 10 mg
total."(Bigley dep. Exhibit 1; Cohen
affidavit Exhibit B) Numerals distinguishing
between the 10 mg ampules and 50 mg vials should
have been
7
See Exhibit 4 to Bigley deposition, a memo in
which Dr. John Lennox, defendant's director of
Quality Assurance, pointed out to Mr. Bigley that
the Aroot cause of the problem" created by
the label is the fact that" all product is 10
mg/mL" and that the overdoses had occurred
because of the Apresumption that the 5 mL vial
contained only 10 mg of vinorelbine, rather than
the 50 mg of drug actually present in the
vial."
clearly
and adequately set forth on the labels of the
containers themselves rather than buried in
lengthy brochures, protocols and correspondence.
See Wogalter Affidavit, paragraph 20. As the Court
of Appeals held in Ziglar, supra, 280
S.E.2d at 518:
|
We
believe that such facts raised a
substantial question as to whether
DuPont was negligent in not instructing
more plainly, on the product's label
itself, that, in cases of accidental
ingestion, vomiting should be immediately
induced by whatever means available.
(Emphasis supplied) |
|
North
Carolina law requires a manufacturer to provide
warnings of any dangers associated with the
product's use. These warnings must be
"sufficiently intelligible and prominent to
reach and protect all those who may be reasonably
expected to come into contact with the
product." Id., 280 S.E.2d 510,
516.
A
manufacturer is also required to give adequate
directions for use of a product, when reasonable
care calls for them. Corprew v. Chemical Corp.,
271 N.C. 485, 491, 157 S.E.2d 98, 103 (1967). In
addition, a manufacturer does not completely
discharge its duty to warn simply by providing
some warnings of some dangerous propensity of its
product at the time of sale. A continuing duty
exists to provide post-sale warnings of any
deficiencies it learns exist in the product to
users. Smith v. Selco Products, Inc., 96
N.C. App. 151, 385 S.E.2d 173 (1989), disc. rev.
denied, 326 N.C. 598, 393 S.E.2d 883 (1990)
(citing Davis v. Silloo Inc., 47 N.C.App.
237, 244, 267 S.E.2d 354, 359, disc. rev. denied,
301 N.C. 234, 283 S.E.2d 131 (1980)).
The
duty of care of a manufacturer in the production
of a dangerous instrumentality or substance is the
"highest" or "utmost" caution,
commensurate with the risks of serious harm
involved. See Ziglar, supra, 280 S.E.2d at
515 and cases cited therein. Defendant had
knowledge and notice prior to Mr. Cope's overdose
that at least two patients had died because
competent nurses read the label on the Navelbine®
vial to contain 10 mg rather than 50 mg, despite
any information that appeared in the
Investigator's Brochure, Open-Label Protocol,
shipping documents and correspondence. These
facts, along with the circumstances of Mr. Cope's
overdose, create jury issues and cannot be
resolved as a matter of law.
C.
AT BEST FOR DEFENDANT THE ISSUE OF CAUSATION
INVOLVES GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACTS
1.
North Carolina Law Does Not Insulate a Drug
Manufacturer's Negligence in Labeling and Warning
Cases with Conduct of Health Care Providers.
Despite
defendant's admissions of negligence both to the
adequacy of its Navelbine® label and
its violation of applicable safety regulations,
defendant is attempting to shift all of the blame
for this needless tragedy to the Durham Clinic and
its employees by arguing that it is protected
against liability by the learned intermediary
doctrine, the intervening negligence doctrine and
alteration or modification of Navelbine®
after it left the defendant. See defendants'
Answer. First of all, the law of North Carolina
does not exonerate defendant from its own
negligence pursuant to a learned intermediary
theory. In the case of prescription drugs
"...the adequacy of the warning by the
manufacturer shall be determined by the
prescribing information made available by the
manufacturer to the health care practioner.."
G.S.' 99B-4(1). In Salmon, supra, the Fourth
Circuit applying North Carolina law, ruled that
simply because a drug manufacturer provides
certain warnings to the treating physician, the
drug manufacturer is not absolved from liability
for negligence causing personal injury to the
patient:
|
...A
jury could reasonably find that...the
company failed to warn physicians,
particularly in its advertising, with
emphasis that was commensurate with the
risk. A jury could also conclude that the
fault of misuse should be shared by both
the physician and the manufacturer. |
|
Salmon,
Id. at 1362
In
addition, in a case involving the same defendant
in this action, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina affirmed the Court of Appeals' reversal
of a summary judgment for the defendant drug
manufacturer that had been entered by the trial
court. The summary judgment had been based on the
deposition testimony of the patient's treating
physician that he did not rely on any of the
information made available by defendants through
advertisements, representations by sales people,
the Physician's Desk Reference, or package inserts
regarding the use and possible dangers of the
products. The physician further denied that the
plaintiff's injuries had been caused by malignant
hyperthermia as plaintiff alleged in the
Complaint. Holley v. Burroughs Wellcome Co.,
318 N.C. 352, 348 S.E.2d 772 (1986). The Supreme
Court of North Carolina ruled that the forecast of
evidence presented in the case was sufficient to
raise a permissible inference that the physician
had relied, directly or indirectly, on information
from defendants' package inserts and promotional
literature thereby establishing a genuine issue of
material fact as to the element of proximate
cause. In rejecting the defendant's argument that
a jury should not be able to decide the question
of whether an adequate warning would have changed
or altered the conduct or treatment of a health
care provider the Supreme Court cited with
approval an Ohio case:
|
Plaintiffs
cite an Ohio Supreme Court case providing
an excellent rationale for allowing the
jury to decide if an adequate warning
would have altered the doctor's conduct. Sealey
v. G D. Searle Company, 67 Ohio St.2d
192, 423 N.E.2d 831 (1981). In that case
plaintiff suffered a stroke and numbness
in her left side as a result of
defendant's failing to warn of the side
effects of the contraceptive Ovulen. The
prescribing doctor testified that Ahe had
acquired full knowledge from other sources
of the increased risk of hypertension and
stroke in women with a history of
toxemia." Id. at 839. The Court
rejected the contention that the doctor's
independent knowledge broke the causal
link. Instead the Court stated : |
|
|
A
warning may serve purposes other than
merely filling gaps in the intended
recipient's knowledge - one many benefit
from being warned or reminded of what he
already knows. Similarly, only
speculation can support the assumption
that an adequate warning, properly
communicated, would not have influenced
the course of conduct adopted by a
physician, even where the physician had
previously received the information
contained therein" Id.
(emphasis supplied) |
|
Furthermore,
not only is there a presumption that the nurse who
administered the overdose to Mr. Cope would have
followed, heeded and complied with an adequate
label and safety warning that there were 50 mg of
Navelbine® in the vial, but, in
addition, the nurse who administered the overdose
to Mr. Cope testified at her deposition that if
the label had shown 50 mg rather than 10 mg she
would have used the contents of one vial to
prepare Mr. Cope's dose because she knew his dose
was 50 mg, and also that she would have complied
with any warning to the effect that there were 50
mg of Navelbine® in the vial (Williams
dep. pp 47, 57). The evidence shows without
dispute that the nurse who administered the
overdose to Mr. Cope was extremely qualified,
Asweated the details" (Cox dep. p 28), was
certified in giving chemotherapy, (Williams dep.
p. 13) had more than ample training and
experience, was hand-picked for her position at
Durham Clinic by Dr. Davis and Dr. Cox (Cox dep.
pp.27-28), that she was an excellent employee who
followed instructions, that she never suffered any
adverse employment actions at any of her jobs,
that she continued to give chemotherapy to
patients at Durham Clinic after the date of Mr.
Cope's overdose and without any negative incident
whatsoever, that she was a highly dedicated,
caring, committed nurse who went into this line of
work in order to help people based on her personal
experiences with friends who suffered from cancer.
In addition, she has given thousands of
chemotherapy treatments and her administration of
Navelbine® to Mr. Cope on August 3,
1994 is the only dosing error she has ever made
(Williams dep. pp. 31, 51). Similarly, the nurse
who administered the overdose in April of 1994 was
highly qualified and had never committed a dosing
error (Adamkiewicz dep. Exhibit 3). At the present
time, plaintiff has not seen any documents
concerning the qualifications of the nurse
involved in the second overdose, but discovery is
continuing and the applicable protocol and
informed consent generally restrict treatment of
patients with Navelbine® by competent
personnel.
In
Whitley v. Cubberly, 24 N.C. App. 204, 210
S.E.2D 289(1974) the Court of Appeals reversed a
summary judgment order in favor of a drug
manufacturer in a case that included claims of
failing to label the drug adequately and failure
to make adequate warnings about the dangerous
properties of the drug to the medical profession.
In this action the doctor testified that he was
familiar with the manufacturer's warnings but not
"completely aware" that there should be
periodic blood studies during treatment with the
drug and that he was not aware of the
manufacturer's warning that it was desirable to
hospitalize patients to perform studies and
observations during therapy. The Court found that
the record did not entitle the defendant to
summary judgment:
|
All
that is significant for present purposes
is that the record does not so clearly
establish that no genuine issue of fact
exists in this regard that Parke, Davis is
entitled to summary judgment as a matter
of law. Only in exceptional negligence
cases is summary judgment appropriate.
AThis is so because the rule of the
prudent man (or other applicable standard
of care) must be applied, and ordinarily
the jury should apply it under appropriate
instructions from the Court." Page
v. Sloan, supra, at 706, 190 S.E.2d at
194. |
|
2.
The Nurse's Administration of the Overdose to Mr.
Cope Is Not an Intervening Act That Insulates
Defendant's Negligence
In
order to prevail on its |